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Abstract
We determine the emergence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly
setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously
determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a setting
where the initial technology is polluting, rms decide whether to be brown or
green and compete in quantities. We nd that the Porter hypothesis may emerge
as a market conguration with all green rms spurred by environmental regulation,
even if consumers are not environmentally concerned. Finally, we single out the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which the green grand coalition is socially
optimal and therefore yields a win-win outcome.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two and a half centuries, since the very beginning of the industrial revo-
lution, the bulk of industrial activities and the associated growth of the world economy
have relied on brown energy delivered by the intensive exploitation of nonrenewable fossil
fuels. It is now widely recognised that, should the economic system continue to go the
brown way, the planet would run out of nonrenewable polluting resources in a matter of
generations; exactly how many is a matter of opinions and estimates, but compared to
the farthest future, it is certainly too small a number. Additionally, future generations
would inherit a planet which would be not only depleted of its pristine stock of resource,
but heavily and perhaps even irreparably transgured for the worse by climate change.
So, the question is whether a mix of private incentives and public policies may avoid the
realization of this scenario. In this paper we model this interplay to show that there may
exist a way of combining prot incentives and policy tools to open up a green production
path.
The key question is: will a number of energy-intensive industries, or even the whole
world economy put itself on a sustainable growth path?1 Is there any hope that large
populations of prot-seeking corporations will indeed turn themselves green as a reaction
to a changing landscape, by positively responding to the introduction of new regulatory
instruments building up binding limits to the environmental impact of rmsactivities?
According to the Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991), we may expect prot-seeking rms
to behave like that, expecting to be better o¤ if they do so, under appropriate policy
stimula.
Over more than two decades, the Porter hypothesis (PH, hereafter)2 has generated
a lively trend of thought about the existence of promising links between public envi-
ronmental concern and rmsgreen strategies (or the lack thereof). The foundation of
this debate asserts the possible existence of positive private returns to pollution control
investment, possibly large enough to more than o¤set the cost of compliance. If this
is true, then a win-win solution triggered by environmental regulation and driven by
rmsreaction to it is in fact within reach. The essence of the PH boils down to the
1Here, sustainablemeans not necessarily altogether green but simply low carbon, as the basic
requirement boils down to reducing the emission rate of production and consumption activities to a
level compatible with the environments capability of absorbing and recycling CO2 and other greenhouse
gases, as it did for ages before the beginning of the industrial revolution.
2See Ambec et al. (2013) for an exhaustive survey of the debate on the PH.
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idea that strict but exible environmental regulation encourages innovations enhancing
competitiveness and contributing to make rms more protable, and therefore happy
to deliver a socially e¢ cient outcome such as a clean (or at least cleaner) environment,
as a by-product of their own private incentives. Porter and van der Linde (1995a,b) in
particular, claim that pollution is often a waste of resources. Under certain conditions,
reducing the latter may drive an increase in rmsproductivity and prots. Regula-
tions therefore may ultimately help rms by unlocking unexpected prot opportunities.3
With this in mind, Porter and van der Lindes (1995a,b) view privileges market-based
instruments (like emission taxes and the costly allocation of pollution rights) rather than
command-and-control instruments (like environmental standards).
The stream of research generated by Porter and van der Linde (1995a,b) has in-
vestigated two di¤erent versions of the PH. The weak one claims that rms do respond
to environmental regulation by investing in R&D for green (either abatement or replace-
ment) technologies, which in turn may not lead to higher prots. The strong version
of the PH says instead that one of the consequences of environmental policy is indeed
that of increasing rmsprot perspectives.4 Obviously, the strong version has generated
a debate which would not have stemmed out of the weak alternative formulation, the
reason being that conventional wisdom has it that, in general, limiting rmsfreedom
should ultimately compromise their performance (cf. Palmer et al., 1995). Hence one
could say that, in a way, the e¤ective merit of Porter and van der Lindes (1995a,b)
papers has been that of convincing businessmen (among whom the PH is receiving a
growing amount of attention) as well as policy makers about the potentially procuous
nature of environmental regulation.
If put into being, the virtuous mechanism embodied in the strong version of the
hypothesis would produce a win-win outcome in which both a cleaner environment and
a higher nancial performance would go hand in hand, as a result of the reciprocal
alignment of private (prot) incentives and social (welfare) incentives.
A distinctive feature of the PH is that it does not necessarily require any con-
sumers environmental awareness, relying primarily on pure prot incentives towards
3Since Gore (1993), politicians have viewed the green economy as a chance for growth and competi-
tiveness for the industry. See also Wagner (2003).
4A third version of the PH is known as narrow, and claims that exible policy instruments outperform
command-and-control instruments as for the resulting innovative incentives perceived by rms. For more
on di¤erent formulations of the PH, see Ja¤e and Palmer (1997).
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green innovations to neutralise environmental regulation. Several studies (indeed, too
many to be exhaustively mentioned here) have shown that world-wide, consumersap-
petite for green products has increased signicantly in the past years (see Kim and Choi,
2005; Chen, 2008, inter alia). The rise of such consciousness has resulted in signicant
environmental improvement (Reitman, 1992). More companies around the world have
reacted by developing eco-friendly products and pollution control investments (Chang,
2011). Higher costs required for the progressive eco-technology are sustainable due to
larger demands of green consumers. PH is seemingly easier to implement if green con-
sumption is in place. This is crucial to justify the trade-o¤ between costs and benets
rendering the policy acceptable. Interestingly, Constantatos and Herrmann (2011) for
instance propose a duopoly model where consumers recognise the green quality of the
products only with a time lag. Thus if regulation does not impose a simultaneous adop-
tion of the eco-friendly technology among companies, a rm unilaterally may lose prots
due to higher costs (which represents a direct e¤ect) and reduce market share due to
higher product prices (which is a strategic e¤ect).
Unlike much of the current literature on environmental issues, including the PH,
the present analysis sets aside the assumption of environmental awareness. Our intention
is to emphasize the possibility to obtain benecial impacts from regulation simply due
to the spontaneous rmss reaction to an environmental policy, the latter being not
amplied or accompanied by any environmental consciousness on the part of consumers.
No variations in demands or information of green technology adoption are needed, and
we will assume that the representative consumer is characterised by a concave utility
function where there is no room for the environmental impact of either consumption or
production. Our point simply rests on the streamlined background idea that competitive
pressure intensied by regulation pushes innovation and the resulting mechanism yields
a Pareto e¢ cient outcome for rms and society alike.5
The extant debate on the PH mostly relies on duopoly models (Ambec and Barla,
2002, 2006; André et al., 2009; Constantatos and Herrmann, 2011; Lambertini and
Tampieri, 2012; inter alia). We instead model an oligopolistic Cournot sector in partial
5Note that our approach has the aim to highlight the role of competition, but does not exclude - in
principle - the presence of environmental awareness. Intuitively, green consumers taking into account
the rmsenvironmental attitude in shaping their consumption decisions would generally prefer to buy
from rms endowed with green technologies. This would be in line with the results supporting the
Porter hypothesis, and would plausibly facilitate the attainment of a win-win solution.
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equilibrium, where rms individually decide whether to be brown or green and then
compete in quantities. Brown rms are subject to a tax rate on polluting emissions. On
the other hand, green rms do not bear any taxes, but incur both a cost of investment in
clean technology and a higher marginal production cost. To characterise rmschoices
concerning the nature of their production technology, we resort to a tool borrowed from
coalition theory (cf. dAspremont et al., 1983; Donsimoni, 1985; Donsimoni et al., 1986;
and Thoron, 1998). Using the concepts of internal and external stability of a coalition
and assessing the welfare properties of the oligopoly under consideration, we identify the
conditions on the two key parameters of the model, the emission tax and the exogenous
R&D cost of obtaining the green technology, such that the green grand coalition (i) is
stable and (ii) generates a win-win solution, thereby yielding a theoretical vindication of
the PH in its strong formulation.
From an empirical perspective, the possibility of systematically testing the emer-
gence of the PH may be limited by several problems a¤ecting the nature of the data as
well as their availability. Indeed, regulatory compliance expenditures do not provide a
truly exogenous measure of regulatory burden since the amount of these costs also de-
pends on the adaptability to regulation of an industry. In light of this, Ja¤e and Palmer
(1997) show the existence of a positive link between R&D expenditures and pollution
abatement costs, as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation. Popp (2005)
examine the presence of the PH by calibrating a model of induced R&D when the the
outcome of innovation is uncertain. The strong version of the PH is here supported in
some cases. Lanoie et al. (2011) test the signicance of the PH using data on envi-
ronmental policy, research and development, environmental performance, and economic
performance. They nd strong support for the weak version but no support for the
strong version. In a recent work, Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) show that only inno-
vation processes inuencing the resource e¢ ciency of rms have a positive net return.
Hence the PH in its strong version does not hold in general, its emergence depending on
the type of environmental innovation applied.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The outline of the setup is in
section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis of coalition stability. Section 4 illustrates the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the strong formulation of the PH to emerge at
equilibrium. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
5
2 The model
Consider a static market with n  2 rms competing à la Cournot-Nash.6 Firms supply
a homogeneous good, whose demand function is p = a   Q; where a is a positive con-
stant parameter measuring the reservation price and Q =
Pn
i=1 qi aggregates all rms
individual output levels qi. Firms can be of two types, either brown or green. A brown
rm uses a polluting production technology and bear an emission tax rate t > 0 imposed
on each unit of output. Conversely, the production of green rms does not a¤ect the
environment, so that no taxation is levied on them. However, green companies face an
investment costs k to implement their green production technology, and their marginal
cost is higher than the one of brown rms. Without loss of generality, we normalise
marginal production cost of a brown rm to zero, whereas the marginal production costs
of a green rm are c 2 (0; a). This assumption reects the higher cost of environmen-
tally friendly resources in the real world. Reports from many countries show that, for
instance, the energy produced with on/o¤shore wind and photovoltaics/thermal solar, is
more costly than the energy obtained from coal or natural gas.7
Before market competition takes place, each rm decides whether to be brown or
green. Suppose that the industry is populated by 1  m  n green rms and n   m
brown rms. The demand function is thus:
p = a mqg   (n m) qb; (1)
where subscripts b and g mnemonic for brown and green, respectively. The prots of a
green rm are dened as follows:
g = (p  c) qg   k; (2)
while those of a brown rm are
b = (p  t) qb: (3)
In the remainder, we shall assume a > t > c. This assumption ensures that (i) the
reservation price is large enough for both types of rm to be viable, and (ii) it may be
6See André et al. (2009) and Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) for a model of vertical di¤erentiation
in a duopoly framework with price and quantity competition, respectively. They both nd that a policy
regulation, i.e., a tax on brown technology is Pareto-improving for all rms. Mohr (2001) propose a
similar framework looking at the impacts of the technological spillovers.
7See the OpenEI database for United States, the 2013 German report by Fraunhofer, and the 2010
British report by Pasons Binckernho¤, inter alia.
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convenient for a rm to be green (otherwise, for any t < c; it would not be convenient
to opt for the green technology). As it is usually assumed, the environmental damage S
is a quadratic function of the quantity produced by brown rms:
S =
v

nP
b=m+1
qb
2
2
; (4)
where v is a positive parameter.
Total tax revenue is T = t
nP
b=m+1
qb, whereas consumer surplus is measured by
CS = Q2=2. Hence, social welfare is dened as the sum of industry prots, consumer
surplus and tax revenue, minus the environmental damage:
SW =
mX
g=1
g +
nX
b=m+1
b + CS + T   S: (5)
3 Stability analysis
To begin with, it is worth noting that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this industry
is equivalent to that emerging in a situation in which there are two sets of asymmetric
rms endowed di¤erent marginal production costs. Here, one is indeed a production cost
while the other is mimicked by the emission tax rate. The market equilibrium is thus
identied by the following pair of output levels:
qmg =
a  c (n m+ 1) + t (n m)
1 + n
; (6)
qn mb =
a+ cm  t (m+ 1)
1 + n
; (7)
for each of them green rms and n m brown ones. The resulting individual equilibrium
prots are
mg =
[a  c (n m+ 1) + t (n m)]2
(1 + n)2
  k; (8)
n mb =
[a+ cm  t (1 +m)]2
(1 + n)2
; (9)
given two generic groups of size m and n m; respectively.
The next step, which drives us into the real of coalition theory, consists in taking
the fully brown industry where m = 0 as a benchmark, to examine the stability of the
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grand coalition made up by n brown rms, in view of the incentive for a rm to become
a green singleton. Fixing, respectively, m = 1 in (8) and m = 0 in (9), we obtain the
following prots expressions:
1g =
[a  cn+ t (n  1)]2
(1 + n)2
  k; (10)
nb =
(a  t)2
(1 + n)2
; (11)
which measure, respectively, (i) the performance of a single rm becoming unilaterally
green, and (ii) that of each rm in the brown grand coalition. There exists an incentive
to abandon the brown grand coalition unilaterally if and only if the following expression
is positive:
1g   nb =
n (t  c) [2 (a  t) + n (t  c)]  (1 + n)2 k
(1 + n)2
: (12)
Observing (12), we may claim
Lemma 1 The brown grand coalition is unstable for all k 2  0; k ; where
k  n (t  c) [2 (a  t) + n (t  c)]
(1 + n)2
:
This implies that if the R&D cost of developing the green technology is su¢ ciently
small, one has to expect unilateral deviations from the status quo ante in which all rms
share the brown technology and bear the emission tax. This produces the additional
question about how many rms will indeed choose to go green.
In order to determine the equilibrium partition of the population of rms between
the brown and green types, we resort to a stability condition borrowed from coalition
theory and used in the literature discussing the optimal size of a cartel facing a compet-
itive fringe, as in dAspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni (1985), Donsimoni et al. (1986)
and Thoron (1998).
We take as the object of our interest the stable green coalition of size m  1. In
the present model, a partition fm;n mg with m green rms and n m brown ones is
stable if no green rm desires to become brown (internal stability) and at the same time
no brown rm desires to shift to green (external stability).
Consider rst the internal stability criterion. For the green coalition of size m to
be stable, there must exist no incentive for any of its member to deviate unilaterally and
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join the brown coalition. Let
n m+1b =
[a+ c (m  1)  tm]2
(1 + n)2
; (13)
denote the prots of a brown rm, when a single green rm quits the m-sized green
coalition to become brown, thereby increasing the numerosity of the brown coalition to
n m+ 1:
Likewise, one can easily compute the prots of a green rm when a brown rm
changes its type becoming a green one, thereby increasing the size of the green coalition
to m+ 1 :
m+1g =
[a  t+ (n m) (t  c)]2
(1 + n)2
  k: (14)
Hence the stability conditions for a market structure with m green rms and n   m
brown rms are: (
mg  n m+1b (internal stability)
n mb  m+1g (external stability)
: (15)
A coalition is dened as internally stable if and only if, for m  1, the prots
of each single green rm associated to other m   1 green rms are higher than those
the same rm would attain by moving from the green coalition towards the alternative
brown coalition. Conversely, a coalition of m green rms is dened as externally stable
if and only if, for m  n   1, there is no incentive for a rm in isolation to move
from the brown coalition towards the green one. We already know from Lemma 1 that
the degenerate coalition consisting in the singleton m = 1 is externally stable for all
k 2  0; k. We are about to show that, provided the cost associated with green R&D is
not too high, the stability conditions (15) are simultaneously veried by some admissible
values of m at least equal to one and at most equal to n. To this aim, dene as (i) mI
the maximum value of m such that internal stability holds, i.e., mg > 
n (m 1)
b ; and (ii)
mE the minimum value of m above which external stability holds, i.e., n mb > 
m+1
g :
The following lemma applies:
Lemma 2 Any k 2

0;bki ensures mI ;mE  1.
Proof. The rst di¤erence related to the internal stability shows that:
mg   n (m 1)b =
n (t  c) [2 (a  c)  (t  c) (2m  n)]  k (1 + n)2
(1 + n)2
 0; (16)
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if and only if
m  mI  n (t  c) [n (t  c)  2 (a  c)]  k (1 + n)
2
2n (t  c)2 :
In turn, mI  1 for all k 2
 
0; k

.
External stability requires
n mb   m+1g =
k (1 + n)2   n (t  c) [2 (a  t) + (t  c) (n  2m)]
(1 + n)2
 0; (17)
which holds for all
m  mE  n (t  c) [2 (a  t) + n (t  c)]  k (1 + n)
2
2n (t  c)2 : (18)
In turn, mE  1 for all k 2

0;bki ; with
bk  n (t  c) [2 (a+ c  2t) + n (t  c)]
(n+ 1)2
: (19)
Note that sign
nbko =signf2 (a+ c  2t) + n (t  c)g : A su¢ cient condition for bk > 0 is
a+ c  2t: If instead a+ c < 2t;
bk > 0, n > 2t  a  c
t  c ; (20)
with (2t  a  c) = (t  c) < 2 always because a > c. Therefore, bk is positive everywhere.
Now observe that the di¤erence between the two critical levels of the R&D cost k
is equal to
k   bk = 2n (t  c)2
(n+ 1)2
> 0: (21)
This indeed implies that, if k 2

0;bki ; then mI ;mE  1.
It is worth stressing that since k > bk; what bites here is the highest admissible level
of the R&D cost below which the external stability requirement is met by a coalition of
admissible size, i.e., at least a singleton. This prompts for a comparison between mI and
mE; because if mE is higher than mI ; then no stable green coalition may exist. A quick
comparison between the two relevant expressions delivers:
Corollary 1 Take k 2

0;bki, so that mI ;mE  1: In this range, mI  mE = 1 every-
where.
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Since m must be an integer, Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 yield the following relevant
result:
Proposition 1 Take k 2

0;bki, so that mI ;mE  1; with mI  mE = 1: In this range,
there exists a stable green coalition of size m 2 [mI ;min fn;mEg] :
Proposition 1 says that there exists an admissible partition of the parameter space
(in particular, a range of values for k) wherein a green coalition is stable, and its size
might even coincide with the entire population of rms. That is, at equilibrium we might
observe the arising of a grand green coalition. To check it out, one has to perform the
analysis of the conditions under which this outcome will indeed obtain and characterise
its welfare properties, in order to verify whether we may expect the whole industry to
attain the win-win solution implied by the strong version of the PH.
4 Green grand coalition and social optimum
In this section, we illustrate the conditions according to which the PH emerges in its
strong version, and we determine the welfare properties of the grand coalition made up
by n green rms.
To begin with, consider that, sincemI mE = 1; n 2 [mE;mI ] is the necessary and
su¢ cient condition to ensure that the grand coalition m = n will indeed be the unique
stable one. Now let aI be the lowest level of the reservation price above which mI > n,
and aE the highest level of the reservation price below which n > mE, respectively. The
following holds:
Proposition 2 For k 2

0;min
nbk;eko and a 2 (aI ; aE) ; the grand coalition consisting
of n green rms is stable.
Proof. The comparison between mI with n yields:
mI   n = a  c
t  c  
n
2
  k (1 + n)
2
2n (t  c)2 : (22)
This di¤erence is positive for all
a > aI  k (1 + n)
2 + n (t  c) [2c+ n (t  c)]
2n (t  c)2 > 0: (23)
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Then, comparing n with mE, we obtain:
n mE = k (1 + n)
2   n (t  c) [2 (a  t)  n (t  c)]
2n (t  c)2 : (24)
A su¢ cient condition for the r.h.s. of (24) to be positive is:
a 2 (t; aE) ; aE  n (t  c) + 2t
2
> t: (25)
Finally, aI < aE i¤
2n (t  c)  k (1 + n)2
2n (t  c) > 0; (26)
which is true for all k 2

0;ek ; where ek  2n (t  c) = (1 + n)2 : Comparing ek against k
and bk; one nds that k > ek everywhere, while bk   ek has the same sign as
2 (a  c) + (n  6) (t  c) ; (27)
which is surely positive for all n  6 but may change sign if industry concentration is
su¢ ciently high.
The foregoing analysis has been carried out identifying thresholds for k below which
(i) a green coalition of size m is stable, and (ii) the grand green coalition m = n arises,
possibly yielding a vindication of the PH in its strong formulation. Hence, one could say
that the level of green R&D costs has a pivotal role in shaping the behaviour of rms.
This, true as it may be, would leave aside the role of emission taxation. Indeed, the
critical thresholds for k are dened in terms of fa; c; n; tg ; i.e., the exogenous parameters
and the policy instruments in the hands of the government. For any triple fa; c; ng and
any k > 0; the policy maker can in fact manipulate t so as to satisfy the two crucial
conditions highlighted in Propositions 1-2, by ne-tuning the emission tax rate in such
a way that k < ek; thus driving rms towards the generalised adoption of the green
technology.
We are left with one last task, which consists in checking whether a green grand
coalition is indeed socially e¢ cient industry conguration.
Proposition 3 The green grand coalition is socially e¢ cient for all k 2

0;min
nek; k; ko ;
where
k  max

0;
a [t  c (n+ 2)] + c [n (n+ 2) t  c (n (n+ 1)  1)]
(n+ 1)2

;
and
k  (a  c)
2
(1 + n)2
:
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Proof. The rst order condition for the maximization of social welfare with
respect to m yields:
@SW
@m
= m3 + m2 + m+  = 0; (28)
where
 = 2v (t  c)2 ;
 =  3v (t  c) [a  cn+ t (n  1)] ;
 =  2ct (2 + n) + a2v   2cnv [2a+ t (n  2)] + (29)
t [t+ v (a (4n  2) + t+ tn (n  4))] + c2 [3 + n (nv + 2)] ;
 = k   c2 (1 + n)2   a2nv + cnt (2 + n  nv) + n k (2 + n) + t2 ((n  1)  1)+
a

c
 
2 + n+ n2v
  t (nv (n  2) + 1) :
We have to verify whether there exists an admissible subset of the parameter space
fa; c; k; n; tg where, at m = n; (i) @SW=@m  0; (ii) the individual equilibrium prots
of a green rm are positive, i.e., m=ng > 0; and (iii) conditions (15) for internal and
external stability are simultaneously satised.
By xing m = n, we may rewrite (28) as follows:
@W
@m

m=n
=
t [a+ cn (2 + n)]  c2 (n2 + n  1)  ac (2 + n)  k (1 + n)2
(1 + n)2
 0; (30)
for all
t  t  c
2 (n2 + n  1) + ac (2 + n) + k (1 + n)2
a+ cn (2 + n)
; (31)
or, equivalently, for all
k  k  a [t  c (n+ 2)] + c [n (n+ 2) t  c (n (n+ 1)  1)]
(n+ 1)2
; (32)
whenever k is positive. This critical level of k must be evaluated against bk and ek.8 This
exercise reveals that bk > k everywhere, while
ek > bk , t > c; (33)
8Recalling that k > bk always, k can be disregarded.
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and
ek > k , t > a+ nc (n+ 6) +pa [1  2cn (3n+ 2)] + c2n [n2 (n+ 4) + 4 (3n+ 2)]
4n
:
(34)
Consider now that the prot function in equilibrium is equal to:
m=ng =
(a  c)2
(1 + n)2
  k > 0 8 k < k  (a  c)
2
(1 + n)2
; (35)
and
k > ek 8 t 2  c; 2cn+ (a  c)p2n
2n
!
;
k  ek 8 t 2 "2cn+ (a  c)p2n
2n
; a
!
:
(36)
For any triple fa; c; ng ; the critical levels
n
k;bk;ek; ko can be drawn in the space (t; k) ;
to obtain Figure 1.
Figure 1: The win-win solution in the space (t; k)
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The vertical dashed lines at t = c and t = a delimit the admissible range. The
starred area above the horizontal axis, below the lower envelope of
nek; k; ko and such
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that t 2 (c; a) ; identies the region we are looking for, in which the green grand coalition
m = n is socially e¢ cient and is indeed delivered by rmsincentives. That is, the starred
area is where the strong version of the PH obtains and delivers a win-win solution.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the presence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly
where the adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of com-
petition among coalitions. We have identied the conditions on the two key parameters
of the model, the emission tax and the exogenous R&D cost of obtaining the green tech-
nology, under which the green grand coalition is stable and generates a win-win solution.
The conditions emerge in equilibrium if the amount of the R&D cost is relatively con-
tained. This result validates the Porter Hypothesis in its strong formulation, i.e., the
introduction of an environmental policy may in fact increase rmsprots. Finally, the
paper evaluates the conditions on the R&D cost under which a green grand coalition is
also socially e¢ cient industry conguration.
An important point is that our results did not rely on the standard assumption
on consumers environmental awareness. This shows that competition intensied by
regulation is su¢ cient to push green innovation and in turn prots. We hope our ndings
will inspire a new, sustainable design of industrial and regulatory policies.
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